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5 May 1997
Revised to add links to domestic terrorism statements of the Department
of Defense and the FBI, annual reports on Global Terrorism, the Chemical
Weapons Convention and ATF reports at end of this report.
14 March 1997
Revised to add links to related WMD documents at end of this report.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Congressional Record: February 26, 1997 (Senate)]
[Page S1658]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr26fe97-127]
REPORT ON THE RESPONSE TO THREATS OF TERRORIST USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION--MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT--PM 17
The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message
from the President of the United States, together with an accompanying
report; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services.
To the Congress of the United States:
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public
Law 104-201), title XIV, section 1411 requires the President to
transmit a report to the Congress that assesses the capabilities of the
Federal Government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents
involving weapons of mass destruction and to support State and local
prevention and response efforts. In accordance with this provision, I
transmit the attached report on the subject issue.
William J. Clinton.
The White House, February 26, 1997.
____________________
[Congressional Record: February 26, 1997 (House)]
[Page H651-H660]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr26fe97-98]
REPORT ON GOVERNMENT CAPABILITIES TO RESPOND TO TERRORIST INCIDENTS
INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION--MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES
The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message
from the President of the United States; which was read and, together
with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the
Committee on National Security:
To the Congress of the United States:
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public
Law 104-201), title XIV, section 1411 requires the President to
transmit a report to the Congress that assesses the capabilities of the
Federal Government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents
involving weapons of mass destruction and to support State and local
prevention and response efforts. In accordance with this provision, I
transmit the attached report on the subject issue.
William J. Clinton.
The White House, February 26, 1997.
Report to Congress on Response to Threats of Terrorist Use of Weapons
of Mass Destruction, January 31, 1997
executive summary
As the result of recent events, significant threats over
the past few years, and the increased availability and
proliferation of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC)
materials, there is an increasing concern for the potential
of terrorist incidents occurring in the United States
involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Under Presidential and Congressional direction, the Federal
Government has made a concerted effort to better respond to
domestic terrorist incidents involving WMD. These efforts
include assessing current capabilities, identifying
shortfalls, and taking steps to remedy them. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as the lead agency for crisis
management in response to a domestic terrorist threat or
incident, has undertaken several initiatives to prevent,
mitigate, and respond to the domestic terrorism threat. The
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), with the
responsibility for consequence management in response to a
terrorist incident, has undertaken several initiatives to
identify and enhance the Federal capability to respond to the
consequences of a terrorist incident. Several departments and
agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD),
Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
are involved in enhancing overall terrorism response
capabilities, with others in the Federal response planning
community actively supporting this effort.
Local response to a terrorist event is critical to the
success of the overall response. Even with a timely Federal
response, local first responders have the immediate
requirement to deal with the incident and care for victims.
FEMA has been working with local and State governments to
assess their response capabilities, identify shortfalls and
take measures to remedy them. These activities include
surveying State terrorism response capabilities, convening a
focus group to discuss capabilities and needs of local
government for NBC response, sponsoring a conference for fire
chiefs from major metropolitan fire departments to discuss
lessons learned from recent international terrorism
incidents, conducting training activities, and developing
exercises featuring terrorism scenarios to test various
aspects of crisis and consequence management activities.
In continuation of these efforts, the Federal Government
has developed a program of activities in Fiscal Year (FY)
1997 encompassing training, some equipment and capability
enhancements, planning, exercises, and other activities
involving Federal, State, and local governments to improve
the current levels of preparedness and response. The initial
focus for training and capability enhancement is to target FY
1997 funding on cities and selected jurisdictions based on
population, risk and geographic distribution. The FY 1997
activities will form the basis for further training,
planning, and capability building efforts in FY 1998 and
beyond for a broader base of jurisdictions, depending on
budget constraints and resource availability.
introduction
Background
Recent trends indicate growing prospects for terrorist
incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In
1993, a bomb rocked the World Trade Center in New York City,
NY; in 1995, Japanese extremists successfully conducted a
chemical attack in the Tokyo subway system and a bomb
destroyed
[[Page H652]]
the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK. The chance
of a significant WMD incident occurring in the United States
is heightened by several factors, including:
Inexpensive production and availability of chemical/
biological (C/B) agents;
Easily obtainable chemical precursors and biological
production processes;
Portability of small amounts of C/B agents especially
useful for clandestine purposes;
Potential for large-scale public impact based on limited
ability to quickly identify and/or contain the effects of
such substances;
Increased WMD stockpiles, with the potential for theft or
acquisition of the weapons by terrorists groups;
Capability of inflicting mass casualties; and,
Increased media coverage of the use of WMD.
Scope of the Report
This report responds to the requirement in the Defense
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, Title XIV,
Section 1411 of Public Law 104-201 (also referred to as the
Nunn-Lugar amendment), for the President to transmit a Report
to Congress that assesses the capabilities of the Federal
Government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents
involving WMD and to support State and local prevention and
response efforts. Also, the report highlights results and
insights gained from earlier Fiscal Year (FY) 1996
initiatives and describes what is planned or under way in FY
1997 to improve Federal, State, and local capabilities.
Finally, it addresses measures to improve capabilities in
future years, including funding requirements, legislative
improvements, and research and development.
Lead Agency Responsibilities
The Department of Justice (DOJ), through the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), has been assigned the lead
responsibility for management of the U.S. Government (USG)
response to terrorist incidents. The FBI derives its
fundamental legal jurisdiction to deter terrorist incidents
from an assortment of Federal statutes and Executive Branch
directives.
The FBI has the lead agency role in crisis management which
entails the process of identifying, acquiring, and planning
the use of resources needed to prevent and/or respond to a
potential or actual terrorist incident. The crisis management
response incorporates and emphasizes prevention, crisis
mitigation efforts, and criminal prosecution of terrorists.
Crisis management activities include proactive measures for
prevention, immediate incident response, and post-incident
response, including command of the operational response as
the on-scene manager for an incident, in coordination with
other Federal agencies and local and State authorities.
FEMA has the responsibility for consequence management
which entails preparedness and response for dealing with the
consequences of a terrorist incident. Consequence management
activities include measures to alleviate damage, loss of
life, hardship, or suffering caused by the incident;
protection of public health and safety; restoration of
essential government services; and provision of emergency
assistance. FEMA will act in support of the FBI in
implementing consequence management response activities.
The overall goal of Administration policy is to ensure that
the United States is prepared to combat domestic and
international terrorism in all its forms. Measures undertaken
under this policy to deal with the terrorism threat include:
Reducing vulnerabilities--To reduce vulnerabilities to
terrorism both at home and abroad, all Federal department
heads have been directed to ensure that their personnel and
facilities are fully protected against terrorism. This
activity includes reviewing the vulnerability of Government
facilities and the critical national infrastructure; reducing
vulnerabilities affecting civilian personnel and facilities
abroad, military personnel and facilities, U.S. airports, and
other transportation modes; and undertaking counterterrorism
measures to reduce both the domestic and international
terrorist threat.
Deterring terrorist acts--To deter terrorism, the USG has
made it clear that its policies will not be affected by
terrorist acts and it will vigorously deal with terrorists
and their sponsors to reduce terrorist capabilities and
support. In this regard, the pursuit, arrest, and prosecution
of terrorists are of the highest priority. Goals include the
disruption of terrorist-sponsored activity including
termination of financial support, arrest and punishment of
terrorists as criminals, application of U.S. laws and new
legislation to prevent terrorist groups from operating in the
United States, and application of extraterritorial statutes
to counter acts of terrorism and apprehend terrorists outside
the United States. Return of terrorists from overseas who are
wanted for violation of U.S. law is of the highest priority
and a central issue in bilateral relations with any country
that harbors or assists them.
Responding to terrorist acts--To respond to acts of
terrorism, there must be a rapid and decisive capability to
protect U.S. citizens, defeat or arrest terrorists, respond
against terrorist sponsors, and provide relief to the
victims. The goal during the immediate response phase of an
incident is to terminate terrorist attacks so that the
terrorists do not accomplish their objectives or maintain
their freedom, while authorities seek to minimize damage and
loss of life and provide emergency assistance to the affected
area. In responding to a terrorist incident, the Federal
Government is working to rapidly deploy the needed Federal
capabilities to the scene, including specialized elements for
dealing with specific types of incidents resulting from WMD
threats.
Recent Initiatives
While the primary Federal focus historically has been on
developing crisis management capabilities, recent events have
necessitated placing an increased emphasis on building
consequence management capabilities as well. Thus, guidance
provided by USG policy has resulted in a number of
initiatives being undertaken in FY 1996 to continue to build
crisis management capabilities and to enhance consequence
management capabilities by assessing Federal, State, and
local capabilities to respond to the consequences of a
nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) WMD terrorist event.
Ongoing activities through FY 1997 build upon these
initiatives and respond to new legislation. Some recent
initiatives include:
Development by the FBI of operational guidelines entitled
Guidelines for the Mobilization, Deployment and Employment of
U.S. Government Elements in Response to a Domestic Terrorist
Threat or Incident.
The formulation of the FBI Domestic Emergency Support Team
(DEST) and the first deployment of the DEST in support of the
1996 Democratic National Convention.
Pilot test of a Metropolitan Medical Strike Team (MMST) for
the Washington, DC, area and in Atlanta, GA, at the 1996
Summer Olympic Games, to provide immediate on-site medical
support in response to a terrorist incident involving WMD.
Multi-agency assessment of the capability of the Federal
Response Plan (FRP) to respond to a WMD terrorist event.
Exercises using terrorism scenarios that address various
aspects of crisis management and consequence management.
Planning, training, and exercises focusing on the terrorism
threat conducted in preparation for the 1996 Summer Olympic
Games, national political conventions, and the 1997
Presidential Inauguration.
Survey of State terrorism response capabilities conducted
in conjunction with the National Governors Association (NGA).
Focus group discussions with management and emergency
responders from four major metropolitan areas on the
capabilities and needs of local government to respond to NBC
WMD terrorist incidents.
Conference for fire chiefs of major metropolitan fire
departments conducted in conjunction with the International
Association of Fire Chiefs featuring lessons learned from
recent international terrorism incidents.
Conferences and exercises on health and medical
requirements needed in response to chemical/biological (C/B)
terrorism sponsored by the Department of Health and Human
Services--Public Health Service (HHS-PHS).
Numerous training activities sponsored by FEMA and the
States to improve responder awareness of the terrorism threat
and to begin to build the knowledge and skills required for
response to such an incident.
Development of the Terrorism Incident Annex to the FRP.
Enhancement of 175 FBI Special Agents to work on WMD
issues.
Establishment of the Hazardous Materials Response Unit
(HMRU) to provide scientific and technical expertise to
enhance FBI forensic and evidence capabilities.
assessment of federal capabilities to prevent and respond to the use of
wmd
Crisis Management/Prevention Capabilities
Lead Agency Role
The FBI has been designated as the lead agency for the
management of the Federal response to terrorist incidents
(hereafter referred to as crisis management). As the lead for
crisis management, the FBI has the responsibility for
proactive measures involving prevention, immediate incident
response, and post-incident response, including functioning
as the commander of the on-scene operational response.
The FBI On-Scene Commander (OSC) is responsible at the
incident site for all decisions to resolve the terrorist
incident, unless the lead agency responsibility is
transferred by the Attorney General (AG) to FEMA, as
warranted. In support of the FBI OSC, or as the designated
lead agency after transfer of the responsibility by the AG,
FEMA coordinates all Federal assistance in support of
consequence management needs resulting from the incident with
the affected State and local governments.
Operational guidelines (entitled Guidelines for the
Mobilization, Deployment and Employment of U.S. Government
Elements in Response to a Domestic Terrorist Threat or
Incident) have been developed by the FBI and are awaiting
final approval by the AG and the National Security Council
(NSC). The Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST), an
interagency support component, has been developed and is
managed by the FBI.
During a significant terrorist threat or event including a
WMD incident, the FBI may deploy a tailored DEST enhanced
with specialized interagency components capable of responding
to situations involving chemical/biological (C/B) or nuclear/
radiological weapons or agents. The FBI-led response will be
activated to provide a graduated, tailored response based on
the type of incident, in accordance with the FBI's Nuclear or
C/B Incident Contingency Plans.
[[Page H653]]
The FBI OSC, as lead agency official, retains the authority
to take appropriate crisis management actions at all times
during the crisis management response. On-scene decisions
with interagency consultation are made with the Command Group
at a Joint Operations Center (JOC), which includes the OSC,
on-scene principals of the DEST agencies, other Federal
agency representatives, and local and State representatives.
The DEST Team Leader (DTL) is designated by the Director,
FBI. The DTL is primarily responsible for providing the FBI
OSC advice and guidance concerning other Federal capabilities
available for use in resolving a WMD terrorist incident. This
includes crisis management and consequence management
assistance, technical or scientific advice, and contingency
planning assistance. Upon arrival at a crisis location, the
DEST conducts an initial situation assessment, develops
appropriate Courses of Action (COAs), makes a consequence
assessment, and provides the OSC with recommendations. The
DTL coordinates this process and thereafter facilitates the
implementation of the OSC's selected COA through specific
taskings. The DTL ensures continuous coordination within the
various DEST components and with the FBI command post
elements, resolves issues within the DEST, ensures effective
communications among response elements, and implements
required changes within the DEST to achieve the most
efficient and effective team possible.
When determined appropriate by the OSC, the FBI command
post will be modified to function as a JOC. The JOC
configuration includes representatives of the primary
participating agencies and Command, Operations, Consequence
Management, and Support Groups as described below:
Command Group--Comprised of senior officials of the FBI,
DOE, DOD, HHS-PHS, FEMA, and other Federal and State
agencies, as appropriate, to provide the OSC with a means to
quickly coordinate and reach decisions on interagency matters
that affect the resolution of the incident.
Operations Group--Contains representatives of the
organizations directly involved in actions in and around the
crisis site and whose actions are deemed critical to the
successful resolution of the crisis.
Consequence Management Group--Contains decisionmaking and
liaison representatives of consequence management
organizations to provide advice on decisions that may have
implications for consequence management, and to provide
continuity in leadership should a consequence management
response become necessary. If consequences become imminent or
actually occur, State and local organizations will initiate
their consequence management actions, with FEMA expediting
the provision of Federal consequence management response
support. The Group is coordinated by FEMA with an FBI liaison
from the OSC.
Support Group--Contains representatives of organizations
whose primary task is to support members of the Operations
Group. Depending on the nature of the crisis, organizations
represented in the Operations Group will be asked to provide
staff for various support components, including Logistics,
Legal, Administrative, Liaison, and Media components. The
Media component serves as the single point of contact for the
coordination and release of public information to the media
from the incident site. DOJ/FBI, in coordination with
participating DEST agencies, will develop a strategy and
procedures for responding to media inquiries. The overall
intent will be for the Federal Government to speak clearly
with one voice regarding any response to a terrorist
incident.
Lead Agency Initiatives
As a result of recent terrorist incidents, and in
recognition of the emerging threat of WMD, the FBI has
enhanced and modified its capabilities. Some of the changes
include:
Establishment of a separate Domestic Terrorism/
Counterterrorism Planning Section. This growing section
includes separate units formed specifically to more
effectively address Domestic Terrorism Operations, WMD,
Special Events Management, and Domestic Terrorism Analysis.
It is anticipated that during Fiscal Year (FY) 1997 the WMD
Unit will divide into two separate units, one handling NBC
proliferation matters, threats, and incidents and the other
managing exercise and response components (such as the DEST)
and implementing the first responder training initiative.
Establishment of the Hazardous Materials Response Unit
(HRMU) within the Laboratory Division. This unit is designed
to lead and augment the Federal science and technology
response capability to terrorist threats/incidents involving
WMD and provide a law enforcement representative in evidence
issues to enhance later prosecutive effectiveness and
efficiency.
Establishment of the Critical Incident Response Group
(CIRG) at Quantico, VA. The CIRG is recognized as an FBI
entity that provides coordinated support to the FBI OSC. The
Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), which has been trained to operate
in a HAZMAT environment, is part of the CIRG. To assist the
HRT in protracted terrorist or other criminal incidents,
regional FBI Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams have
been enhanced to provide additional tactical support;
however, at this time only the HRT has equipment and trains
in a HAZMAT environment. The CIRG provides additional
operations support in the areas of negotiation, behavioral
profiling and assessment, and crisis management support.
Interagency Capabilities
To successfully resolve a WMD incident, closely coordinated
efforts with appropriate Federal, State, and local law
enforcement agencies and other authorities having emergency
capabilities to respond to and mitigate the consequences of
such an incident will be utilized by the FBI. Appropriate
Federal agencies will support the FBI by providing personnel
and equipment that will be rapidly deployed and made
available for advice and assistance, as warranted by the
situation and at the request of the OSC at the incident site.
In order to develop close working relationships among Federal
agencies concerned with a potential WMD incident, many
interagency working groups (IWGs) have been established, some
of which are:
Various Coordinating Sub-Groups, including a Sub-IWG on
Exercises co-chaired by the FBI, and a Sub-IWG on Nuclear
Trafficking;
Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) for research and
development, science, and technology devoted to
counterterrorism;
Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT),
Chemical/Biological/Radiological (CBR) Subcommittee;
SHIELD Group dealing with C/B proliferation, chaired by the
Department of State (DOS);
Nuclear Export Violation Working Group (NEVWG);
Missile Trade Analysis Group (MTAG); and
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEC).
Interagency Roles and Responsibilities
The primary agencies participating in the response to a WMD
incident include DOJ, DOD, DOE, HHS, EPA, and FEMA. Depending
on the specific details of an incident, the FBI may also
request specialized assistance from other agencies, including
the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Department of
Agriculture (USDA), the Department of the Treasury, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), DOS, and the U.S.
Intelligence Community (IC). The participating agencies will
be incorporated into the existing onscene FBI crisis
management structure, which is designed to provide the FBI
OSC with a graduated and flexible response capability. For a
WMD incident, the DEST will include a specially configured
nuclear or C/B response component with staffing and equipment
from appropriate Federal agencies, including DOD, DOE, HHS,
EPA, and FEMA. Other agencies may be tasked to support the
FBI on a case-by-case basis in an effort to prevent,
mitigate, and/or manage a WMD incident or threat. Department
and agency responsibilities include the following:
The Secretary of Defense has responsibility for:
Providing military units that can assist in both the crisis
management and consequence management aspects of a WMD
incident;
Designating the supporting equipment and those technical
personnel who possess the required expertise to deploy with
the DEST;
Designating pertinent assets for technical response, such
as the identification of on-site contaminants, sample
collection and analysis, limited decontamination
capabilities, air monitoring, medical diagnosis and treatment
of casualties, and render-safe procedures for WMD material;
Providing for the custody, transportation, and disposal of
a C/B WMD when beyond the capability of an otherwise
cognizant agency and after consultation with DOJ/FBI and EPA,
or of nuclear and/or radiological material when beyond the
capability of an otherwise cognizant agency (e.g., DOE or
EPA) and after consultation with DOJ/FBI and DOE; and
Providing other support to the OSC through the use of
military assets.
The Secretary of Energy has responsibility for:
Analyzing threat messages, through the Communicated Threat
Credibility Assessment Program, for technical content,
nuclear design feasibility, and general credibility, and for
providing such analyses to the FBI;
Designating those technical personnel and supporting
equipment to deploy with the DEST as the Nuclear/Radiological
Advisory Team (NRAT). The NRAT will normally include a DOE
Senior Official who will coordinate the overall DOE response
at the scene and liaise with other agencies on matters of
mutual concern. The responsibilities of the NRAT are to: Make
a scientific and technical assessment of the situation,
provide scientific and technical advice to the designated
OSC, provide scientific and technical recommendations,
including risk/consequence information and requirements for
follow-on assets, support tactical operations as directed by
the FBI OSC, and perform limited technical measurements and
conduct liaison with appropriate DOE response assets.
Designating those specialized personnel, along with
specialized instrumentation and equipment, to assist Federal
agencies in locating nuclear weapons or special nuclear
material that may be lost, stolen, or associated with bomb
threats using the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST). The
responsibilities of the NEST are to provide for: Search of
nuclear materials, identification of nuclear materials,
diagnostics and assessment of suspected nuclear devices, and
disablement and containment programs.
Providing scientific and technical assistance and support
to the FBI, DOD, and FEMA in the areas of threat assessment
and
[[Page H654]]
search operations, access operations, diagnostic and device
assessment, disablement and render-safe operations, hazards
assessment, containment, relocation and storage of special
nuclear material evidence, and in post-incident cleanup;
Acquiring, maintaining, and making available any special
equipment and capabilities required to provide the necessary
scientific and technical assistance; and,
Providing tactical/operational advice and assistance in
supporting the FBI for incidents on a DOE facility or
involving weapons or material in DOE custody.
The Secretary of Health and Human Services has
responsibility for:
Designating those technical personnel and supporting
equipment to deploy with the DEST;
Providing technical advice and assistance, such as threat
assessment, identification of contaminants, sample collection
and analysis, on-site safety and protection activities,
medical management plans, and the provision of health and
medical care;
To support this effort, pertinent assets capable of
representing the following resources will be made available
to the FBI in response to a WMD incident or threat: Office of
Emergency Preparedness/Office of Public Health Service (OEP/
OPHS), Federal Interagency C/B Rapid Deployment Team (CBRDT),
Medical Management Support Unit (MSU), Medical Response Teams
and Specialty Teams, and Agency Support, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC); Food and Drug Administration
(FDA); Agency For Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
(ATSDR); National Institutes of Health (NIH); Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA); Health
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA).
The Administrator of the EPA has responsibility for:
Designating technical personnel and supporting equipment to
deploy with the DEST;
Providing technical advice and assistance, such as
monitoring, identification of contaminants, sample collection
and analysis, and on-site safety, prevention, and
decontamination activities;
Issuing any permits required for the custody,
transportation, and disposition of chemical material; and
Making appropriate assets from the following resources
available to the FBI in response to a domestic WMD threat or
incident: Office of the Emergency Coordinator, EPA,
Environmental Response Team, Edison, NJ, Federal On-Scene
Coordinators (FOSCs), located in all EPA Regional Offices,
supported by technical assistance contractors to operate in
contaminated environments; sample, monitor, cleanup, etc.,
National Response Team (NRT), the 16-agency team chaired by
EPA, Regional Response Teams (RRTs), 13 teams co-chaired by
EPA and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) that support the FOSCs,
Office of Radiation and Indoor Air (ORJA)/Center for Risk
Modeling and Emergency Response (CRMER), Radiological
Emergency Response Team, National Enforcement Investigations
Center (NEIC), and laboratory support, including: Regional
Environmental Services Division and contract labs, Office of
Water-Technical Support Division, Cincinnati, OH, National
Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory (NAREL),
Montgomery, AL, and Office of Radiation Programs, Las Vegas,
NV.
The Director of FEMA has responsibility for:
Designating appropriate liaison and advisory personnel to
deploy with the DEST; and
Coordinating on-site consequence management activities with
State, local, and appropriate Federal agencies.
Consequence Management/Response Capabilities
Lead Agency Role
FEMA is responsible for the coordination of Federal
emergency response activities in support of State and local
governments. FEMA coordinates these activities using the
concept of operations described in the interagency Federal
Response Plan (FRP) and supports other Federal emergency
response plans, as described below.
A WMD terrorist incident may occur without warning and
immediately impact large numbers of people. The incident may
affect a local jurisdiction, several jurisdictions within a
State, or several States. The existing emergency response
system may be severely stressed in providing a timely and
effective response to the consequences of the incident. Local
resources are likely to be quickly exhausted or unavailable
to meet the complex requirements of such an event, including
immediate needs for lifesaving resources, resulting in a
requirement for Federal assistance to augment State and local
resources. Due to the potentially devastating impact,
coordination at all levels of Government is critical to
ensuring that response needs are met. In responding to the
consequences of a terrorist incident, the primary objective
of the Federal response is to assist State and local
governments in carrying out their responsibilities to prevent
or minimize the loss of life and property.
Over the years, a significant base of capability has been
developed at the local, State, and Federal levels of
government for responding to natural disasters and
technological emergencies, including incidents involving
nuclear and chemical materials.
The current response framework includes an array of
emergency plans, capabilities, and resources of local, State,
and Federal governments, and of private and voluntary
organizations. At the Federal level, emergency plans deriving
from statutory authorities. Executive orders, national
security guidance, and other guidance are used by departments
and agencies to carry out their emergency response missions.
Under this response framework, Federal resources and
capabilities are provided to augment those of State and local
responders, including private and voluntary organizations.
Existing Federal plans are also being adapted for response to
the consequences of a terrorist incident. Current interagency
plans include:
The Federal Response Plan, supported by 29 departments and
agencies, is used by FEMA for responding to any incident or
situation requiring or potentially requiring Federal
emergency or disaster assistance. The FRP implements the
authorities of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.) to provide
Federal assistance to save lives, protect property, ensure
public health and safety, and recover from the impact of the
incident or event.
The Stafford Act provides FEMA with the authority to assign
missions to any Federal department or agency in support of a
disaster or emergency declared by the President.
The Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP),
supported by 17 Federal departments and agencies, is used to
coordinate the Federal radiological response to an incident
involving nuclear materials. Radiological response activities
under the FRERP include monitoring and assessing the
situation, developing and recommending protective action
recommendations for the affected population, and serving as
the primary Federal source of technical and public
information regarding the radiological incident.
The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan, or National Contingency Plan (NCP),
supported by 15 Federal departments and agencies, is used to
coordinate the Federal environmental response to an incident
involving HAZMAT, including chemical agents. Environmental
response activities include monitoring, decontamination, and
long-term restoration.
As a supplement to the FRP, HHS has recently developed a
Health and Medical Services Support Plan for the Federal
Response to Acts of C/B Terrorism to coordinate the Federal
public health and medical care response to an incident
involving C/B materials, including biological agents. Public
health and medical care response activities include
assessment, triage, treatment, transportation,
hospitalization, and followup of victims of a C/B incident.
Assessment of Response Capabilities
FEMA has been tasked by the NSC to review the adequacy of
the FRP to respond to nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC)
WMD terrorism incidents and to identify and remedy any
shortfalls in stockpiles, capabilities, or training that
would affect our ability to respond. Scenarios describing NBC
WMD incidents were used to help Federal, State, and local
responders focus on the capabilities that would be required
and to assess the adequacy of current capabilities to meet
response requirements. The Federal effort included a review
of the coordination of consequence management activities with
crisis management activities, an examination of the
relationships among existing Federal interagency emergency
plans, an assessment of the capabilities of the FRP to
respond to an NBC WMD incident, the availability of medical
capabilities for terrorism response, and procedures for
military support of medical facilities and decontamination
activities.
The assessment of the FRP and Federal capabilities focused
on identifying shortfalls in stockpiles, capabilities, and
training that would affect the Federal Government's ability
to respond. In conducting the review and subsequent
assessment, FEMA sought input from the 29 departments and
agencies supporting the FRP. Comprehensive scenario-specific
information was provided by key responding agencies including
DOD, DOE, HHS, and EPA. Major findings from the assessment
are grouped under the following categories:
Planning and Coordination
Need for baseline information on capability to respond at
all levels.--Emergency planners at all levels lack adequate
information on how local, State, and Federal responders are
organized, equipped, and trained to respond to a terrorist
incident. There is a need for a carefully structured national
inventory of local, State, and Federal capability to respond
to NBC WMD terrorist incidents.
Need for better Federal interface with State and local
authorities in planning for and developing a mutually
supportive NBC WMD response capability.--A comprehensive
system is required to provide effective coordination across
political jurisdictions for organizing, training, exercising,
and responding to a credible NBC WMD terrorist threat or
actual terrorist incident, including a strategy for
developing and sustaining fully interoperable capability,
coordinating training, exercises and evaluation procedures,
and supporting mutual operations needs.
Need for a tailored and timely Federal response to support
or augment local and State first responders.--Emergency
response actions taken during the initial minutes and hours
after an NBC WMD terrorist incident are critical. The
capability of local and State first responders, augmented by
the use of supplemental Federal resources, needs to be
effectively understood and coordinated.
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Initial response options may be severely limited until
reliable assessments are made of the NBC WMD consequences at
the incident site; therefore, the enhancement of rapid
assessment capabilities, including specialized information
sharing systems for rapid identification of NBC WMD agents,
needs to be a high priority.
Need to finalize the FRP Terrorism Incident Annex.--The
draft FRP Terrorism Incident Annex responds to NSC guidance
by linking existing Federal authorities, plans, and
capabilities that would be implemented in response to a
terrorist incident. The Annex was used to help structure
preparedness measures for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games and
other special events.
Need to prioritize the use of the transportation
infrastructure to ensure rapid movement of critical, time-
sensitive response resources.--Disaster response requires
time-urgent actions by a large number of participants from
the Federal, State, and local response communities. Unless
prior planning and prioritization of critical lifesaving
response resources are in place and appropriate discipline is
maintained, critical elements of the coordinated Federal
response in support of State and local authorities will not
be available when needed. Plans for the response to an NBC
WMD terrorist incident must include a prioritized listing of
critical response assets and the assurance of the timely
transportation, deployment, and support of time-sensitive
critical resources.
Need to deal with a large number of victims impacted by an
NBC WMD terrorist incident.--Planning needs to address the
management of large number of potentially contaminated
victims and/or the disposition of human remains resulting
from an NBC WMD incident. Adequate means must be developed
for identifying and tracking victims who may suffer immediate
or longer-term consequences from exposure to NBC WMD
materials, and who experience psychological trauma from
actual or perceived injury or contamination. Appropriate
implementing procedures, including public information and
other preparedness measures, should be included in all
training and orientation efforts.
Need to manage the stringent public safety measures in
response to an NBC WMD terrorist incident.--Actions required
to establish and maintain positive control of a potentially
contaminated area involved in a terrorist incident will
require aggressive and, at times, forceful action which is in
sharp contrast to conventional disaster response operations.
Immediate, assertive, and time-sensitive public safety
actions might not be fully understood or accepted by local
officials and the public. Therefore, public safety
requirements need to be fully addressed in emergency and
disaster planning in order to deal with the unique and
demanding requirements of response to an NBC WMD terrorist
incident in coordination with State and local authorities.
Need for fully coordinated, timely, and accurate emergency
public information.--With different emergency organizations
responding, assessing, and reporting through a variety of
Federal plans and programs (with many having no prior
experience operating together in an NBC WMD environment),
critical information may not be fully coordinated.
Technically accurate, complete, and time-sensitive
information will be urgently required by the OSCs, national
authorities, and the public. Procedures should be established
that mandate the establishment and coordinated use of a
single Joint Information Center (JIC) that serves the
combined response community. Sources of technically accurate
information need to be identified, and where appropriate,
comprehensive and time-sensitive information on NBC WMD
protective measures should be developed and prepositioned to
ensure immediate availability. Procedures need to ensure that
the JIC is responsive to the particular threat and changing
requirements of each phase of the disaster response.
Need for an electronic information management and
communications capability to facilitate response
coordination.--There is no dedicated system for the
electronic transfer of information among headquarters
elements and other emergency operations centers at the
national level. This lack of capability extends to State and
local entities. Also, there is no national system of priority
cellular access by emergency response personnel that ensures
cellular access and allows coordination of critical assets
within the disaster area. There is a need to continue
development of an interagency electronic transfer mechanism
that provides a dedicated forum for the electronic exchange
of critical emergency response information among Federal
departments and agencies.
Equipment and Training
Need for specialized equipment and coordinated training for
response to an NBC WMD terrorist incident.--Local, State, and
Federal organizations and personnel, and private industry
supporting critical infrastructures need to be adequately
equipped and trained to respond to an NBC WMD terrorist
incident. there is a lack of specialized equipment and
training, as well as standardization and interoperability
necessary to fully respond in a safe, timely, and effective
manner. A national program is needed to provide standards and
resources for the organizing, equipping, and training of
emergency personnel responding to NBC WMD acts of terrorism.
This approach should build upon existing national programs
and capabilities wherever possible and also identify
opportunities for mutual support and cost savings in the
procurement of equipment, delivery of specialized training,
conduct of exercises, and operational evaluations.
Need to adequately protect all responders.--Safety
considerations for first responders and augmentees from all
sources in the initial phases of consequence management need
to be a major factor in planning and preparedness.
Stockpiles
Need for adequate medical supplies and pharmaceuticals to
be available or stockpiled to respond to an NBC WMD terrorist
incident in a timely manner.--HHS has noted that adequate
medical supplies and pharmaceuticals are not prepositioned
and readily available for timely use in response to NBC WMD
incidents. Mitigating and antidote medications need to be
stockpiled at multiple locations throughout the United
States. These stockpiled medications should include specialty
medicines, antidotes, diagnostic devices, and general
medications for anticipated conditions resulting from a
terrorist incident. The Department of Veterans Affairs
hospital centers will serve as feasible stockpile locations
in view of the multiple sites in the United States and
distribution channels already in place. Discussion should
also be initiated with specialty medicinal manufacturers
regarding internal stockpiles of medications for immediate
distribution to an incident site.
Assessment Summary
An NBC WMD terrorist incident may occur as a local event
with potentially profound national implications. In
responding to an NBC WMD incident, first responders must be
able to provide critical resources within minutes to mitigate
the effects of NBC materials. As the capability of the local
government to deal with the immediate effects of an incident
is essential to the success of any NBC WMD response,
enhancing or building and maintaining the local capability
with trained and adequately equipped responders are key
components of a viable national terrorist response
capability.
While the assessment of the FRP and Federal capabilities
found some deficiencies in overall capability, it also
identified several current capabilities being built upon or
expanded to ensure a more viable national NBC WMD responder
capability. Current initiatives for supplementing existing
plans, enhancing operations response capabilities, and
increasing the availability of training are described in the
Requirements for Improvements in Capabilities section of this
report.
assessment of federal capabilities to support state and local
prevention and response efforts
Crisis Management/Support Activities
Many law enforcement, public safety, and emergency response
agencies in the United States are well trained and equipped
to handle the events surrounding many natural and
technological emergency situations, such as improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) or HAZMAT spills, without the
involvement of the Federal Government. However, it is
anticipated that the threatened or actual use of WMD will
rapidly overwhelm local and State capabilities and require
Federal assistance. In addition to advanced technological
assistance available from Federal departments and agencies
for the disablement, transport, disposal, and decontamination
of such weapons and their effects, the primary jurisdiction
for the resolution of a terrorist or criminal incident
involving WMD also rests with the Federal Government;
therefore, a Federal response deployment will be needed to
augment the initial local response.
As the actions taken and notifications made within the
first minutes of a response are critical to the ultimate
resolution of the incident, first responders to a WMD
incident need specialized training and equipment to ensure
that their activities in response to the discovery or use of
WMD are done in a manner that facilitates transition to
Federal response operations. The FBI engages in a number of
activities with State and local agencies to prevent and
respond to acts of WMD terrorism, including planning,
training, exercises, task forces, and intelligence sharing.
Planning
The FBI has been involved throughout the United States in
developing plans to respond at a local level to a WMD event.
Numerous FBI field offices have worked with State and local
law enforcement and other emergency response agencies in
planning the response to an event that incorporates the wide
variety of resources that would be brought to bear on such an
event. These plans are updated through continuous
coordination and tested through various exercises.
Police, fire, and emergency medical personnel need to
better understand the FBI's role in coordinating the response
to a WMD threat or incident. To that end, the FBI is in the
process of coordinating and disseminating national and local-
level plans for a WMD event relevant to the activities of
First responders. This effort is further described in the
section on Requirements for Improvements in Capabilities. As
discussed below, the FBI also has dedicated significant
resources for planning the design and content of a first
responder training initiative.
Training and Exercises
This past year, the FBI tasked all 56 of its field offices
to conduct C/B WMD terrorism exercises in each of their
regions in accordance with guidelines set forth in the FBI's
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C/B Incident Contingency Plan. This includes coordination and
participation by other public safety agencies that would be
involved in a C/B WMD incident, including first responders,
regional offices of supporting Federal agencies, and State
emergency management agencies involved in consequence
management. Each of the 56 field offices has taken action in
response to this tasking, and all are in the process of
planning and conducting C/B WMD exercises.
The FBI is actively engaged with FEMA and other Federal
agencies in developing WMD training for State and local
emergency First responders. In training First responders
throughout the country, this program will incorporate
material from all aspects of the response to WMD terrorism,
including both local crisis and consequence management
activities. The approach to training and equipping Federal,
State, and local officials for managing a crisis involving a
use or threatened use of a WMD, including the consequences of
the use of such a weapon, necessarily requires an
understanding of the training mechanisms and delivery systems
already in place that address target audiences on related
matters and, which, with some adaptation, could accommodate
the WMD subject matter. Thereafter, an assessment of the
audiences and curricula that remain unaddressed can then be
made. Many excellent training courses are currently available
across the nation from Federal agencies including FEMA, DOD,
DOE, EPA, and various State agencies. The FBI is working to
incorporate law enforcement concerns into such training,
including evidence protection and preservation.
Another successful training initiative has been the DOE
Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST), which supports the FBI
as lead Federal agency in various threats involving nuclear
material. Through an ongoing cooperative FBI/DOE program,
nuclear-related briefings are provided by NEST personnel at
FBI field offices throughout the country. As part of this
program, the field offices invite State and local law
enforcement agencies, as well as first responders, to these
briefings. Through these briefings, participants are made
aware of the resources available and are provided with an
overview of how the Federal Government investigates, manages,
and responds to nuclear-related events. To date, 40 FBI field
offices, including the largest metropolitan divisions, have
received NEST briefings, and additional field offices are
being briefed each month.
In preparation for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games, the FBI
conducted a series of NBC-related counterterrorism exercises,
including tabletop, command post, and full-field exercises.
These exercises included participation by FEMA, EPA, HHS-PHS,
DOD, and DOE; Georgia and Alabama State public safety and
emergency management agencies; as well as city and county
public safety and emergency management agencies. In addition,
the FBI actively participated in several exercises hosted by
other Federal agencies in preparation for the Olympics that
focused on possible terrorist incidents, including WMD
scenarios.
The FBI actively runs the Awareness of National Security
Issues and Response (ANSIR) program. The ANSIR program
disseminates information to industry and the public in
general concerning national security matters, particularly
key issues dealing with terrorism, espionage, proliferation,
economic espionage, targeting of the national information
infrastructure, targeting of the U.S. Government, perception
management, and foreign intelligence activities.
Task Force/Intelligence Sharing
The most effective response to any potential or actual WMD
incident is a well-integrated effort across local, State, and
Federal agencies. The FBI has been involved in a number of
actions related to recent events within the United States.
For example:
Federal and local components of the FBI participated in the
1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta, GA, including pre-event
WMD training scenarios previously discussed, various
interagency task forces involved with event management and
intelligence activities, and other activities in support of
the event.
Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) components deployed
in support of the 1996 Democratic National Convention in
Chicago, IL. This deployment was the first of its kind under
the DEST concept.
The FBI is participating in the development of the
Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams (MMSTs), organized by HHS
to respond to incident health and medical services
requirements.
The FBI manages 12 standing law enforcement task forces
throughout the country. These task forces include both local
entities such as sheriffs and State police, as well as local
representatives of Federal agencies such as the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS), Secret Service, and the
U.S. Marshals Service. These task forces are prevention-
oriented groups that allow the exchange and coordination of
intelligence and activities across the law enforcement
community.
Consequence Management/Support Activities
Any assessment of Federal capabilities to support State and
local response efforts must address the abilities of State
and local governments to respond to an incident and their
expectations related to Federal response and support.
Obviously there is great variation in response capabilities
between jurisdictions at both the State and local levels of
government. Local and State capabilities to respond to the
consequences of such an event also vary with the particular
agent used and whether it involves NBC material. For example,
States and communities in proximity to nuclear power
plants have better developed capabilities for responding
to nuclear incidents than those that are not. Similarly,
States and communities in proximity to chemical weapon
disposal sites will have expanded capabilities for
responding to a terrorist event involving a chemical
weapon. Finally, States and communities that have hosted
special events that might pose a target for terrorism,
such as the 1996 Summer Olympic Games, national political
conventions, or high-visibility national conferences and
gatherings, are likely to have more complete terrorism
response plans than those that have not planned for such
events.
FEMA has been working closely with State and local
governments to determine the extent to which their response
capabilities are adequate to meet the challenges of
responding to a WMD incident. Results from a National
Governors Association (NGA) survey, a training focus group
involving metropolitan area jurisdictions, and discussions
with fire and emergency management constituencies provide
good feedback on general State and local capabilities and
support requirements. The scenarios describing WMD terrorist
events involving NBC agents used in the Federal assessment
also were used to help State and local responders focus on
the capabilities that would be required and to assess the
adequacy of their current consequence management
capabilities. While the formats used for assessing the
capabilities differed, the findings from the local and State
efforts were surprisingly similar to the Federal findings.
The following summarizes the findings regarding
capabilities and deficiencies obtained from the NGA State
survey and the metropolitan area training focus group under
the categories of planning and guidance, response resources,
and training and exercises. Included is an assessment of
Federal support capabilities required in each area.
Planning and Guidance
The majority of the 22 States responding to the NGA survey
and all 4 of the cities participating in the terrorism focus
group indicated that their plans address or include response
to a terrorist incident; however, the responses also
indicated that current planning is not adequate. Many
participants in the metropolitan area focus group had limited
understanding of the provisions of the Stafford Act (which
authorizes and funds support for Federally declared
disasters) and the assistance available under the Federal
Response Plan. The metropolitan areas in general did not have
a good understanding of the resources and support which the
Federal Government could provide and how they would go about
accessing those resources. The need to continue to stress the
importance of communication and coordination between those
responsible for crisis management and consequence management
at all levels of government was noted by both State and local
officials.
Other planning-related requirements included a need for a
more thorough assessment and inventory of local response
capabilities and expertise, expanded public awareness of the
terrorism threat, additional planning for medical treatment
and decontamination procedures (including management of mass
fatalities), and legal guidance on the liabilities and
authorities for governmental jurisdictions associated with
response to NBC incidents. Many of these planning-related
requirements parallel deficiencies noted in the State survey
and the previously noted Federal assessment.
Significant progress has been made in defining the
responsibilities of various Federal agencies in a terrorist
event through planning initiatives, exercises, and
Administration guidance. While Federal agencies are assisting
their various counterparts at the State and local levels in
terrorism planning to the extent that their resources allow,
continuing integration of Federal planning with State and
local planning is needed to ensure interoperability between
plans at the various levels of government.
Response Resources
Resource requirements identified by both State and local
governments include detection equipment, personal protective
equipment (PPE), decontamination equipment and techniques,
medical supplies, and access to technical information and
additional trained response personnel. Most Sates and
communities have some resources and capabilities in each of
the above areas, but given the possible magnitude of the
incident and the involvement of unfamiliar and potentially
lethal agents, most local responders felt that their existing
capabilities were either inadequate (for certain C/B agents)
or would be rapidly overwhelmed.
While the Federal Government, especially DOD, DOE, HHS, and
EPA, has relevant expertise and possesses some specialized
equipment and supplies, the adequacy of the necessary
equipment, supplies, and personnel to meet potential
requirements and the Federal ability to get them to the
incident site vary with both the particular resource required
and the geographic location of the incident. Delays
associated with getting the required equipment and technical
expertise to the site where they are needed will likely
result in increased fatalities; however, costs associated
with providing appropriate equipment
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and supplies to all localities nationwide are extremely high.
Training and Exercises
Most States and major metropolitan areas have personnel
trained in emergency response and disaster management with
training delivery systems. In terms of nuclear and chemical
WMD, many of the principles of HAZMAT and radiological
incident response (e.g., scene management, decontamination,
etc.) will apply with some modifications or enhancements.
Training developed by FEMA and the DOD Chemical Stockpile
Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) has direct
applicability to terrorist events using chemical agents;
however, relatively little training exists on management of
incidents involving a biological agent. This is an area of
concern for both State and local responders.
Most requirements noted by both the States surveyed and the
metropolitan focus groups addressed the unique
characteristics of C/B WMD agents and the associated
protective measures for response personnel, incident
management skills to deal with potentially large numbers of
casualties, and the political and public affairs challenges
associated with a terrorist incident. Specifically, they
noted a need for (1) additional training for first responders
on response actions for incidents (where the hazard is known
versus unknown) and use of the appropriate PPE for the
various agents; (2) training on how to use the media
effectively, coordinate media messages, and minimize public
panic; (3) training on how to plan for and manage victim and
family assistance in a mass casualty event; (4) training and
assistance on medical management issues including triage and
decontamination procedures, using available medical
resources, and how to deal with immediate and long-term
treatment issues; and (5) multi-agency and multi-
jurisdictional training and exercising to clarify roles and
responsibilities and improve interoperability of plans and
procedures.
With the possible exception of biological terrorism, there
is considerable technical expertise and many existing
training materials within the Federal community to address
most of the requirements cited above; however, the size and
diversity of the target audience compared with the resources
available to deliver the training and to exercise plans
limits the Federal Government's capability to provide the
required support immediately, thus making this a multi-year
effort.
REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN CAPABILITIES
Assessments of Federal, State, and local capabilities to
respond to WMD terrorist incidents have identified several
areas where improvements are required. FY 1997 funds have
been allocated to several agencies for WMD-related
activities. The FBI has received $133.9 million for
Counterterrorism (CT) enhancements. These funds include
increased staffing to conduct CT field investigations
regarding WMD threats, infrastructure vulnerability, key
assets, and international terrorism; resources for improving
forensic and crisis management capabilities including
specialized equipment, deployable laboratories and teams,
training, and forensic database development; and other
staffing and resources for improving WMD prevention and
response.
Some $15 million has been allocated to FEMA for consequence
management planning and coordination, assessment and
training, personnel and protective measures, and grants for
specialized training and equipment for firefighters. Besides
the above, additional funds have been allocated to DOD, HHS,
DOT, and other Federal agencies for terrorism-related
activities.
Several activities and initiatives are already under way to
address requirements to improve capabilities for responding
to the threat or occurrence of a WMD incident, focusing on
training, equipment and capability enhancements, planning,
exercises, new initiatives, and research and development to
improve the overall local, State, and Federal response
capability. All of these activities are being closely
coordinated with those of local and State governments to
ensure optimal sharing of knowledge and expertise in WMD,
while deriving maximum benefit from available resources.
Training
This area involves training for individuals involved in all
areas of WMD prevention and response. It includes developing
and implementing an interagency strategy for meeting priority
training requirements efficiently. Several facets of current
training activities are described below.
The FBI is pursuing significant efforts to prevent a WMD
incident from occurring through continued proactive and
interactive training, planning, exercising, intelligence
gathering, and technology applications involving crisis
management and consequence management agencies.
The FBI continues with WMD-related interagency training
involving nuclear and C/B incident contingency planning for
FBI Headquarters personnel and field office managers. The FBI
continues to coordinate with DOD and other government
agencies to determine the best equipment, protective gear,
and training available. Ongoing training related to
successfully operating in a hostile WMD environment will be
required for the FBI Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and other FBI
tactical personnel. Equipping and training of selected FBI
field office Evidence Response Teams (ERTs) to augment the
Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) in the forensic
exploitation of potentially contaminated crime scenes will
also be an ongoing activity.
DOD, in coordination with DOE, FEMA, and other Federal
agencies, including the FBI, is providing WMD training to
State and local first responders, including local and State
police, and fire and emergency medical personnel who would
most likely represent the initial response at the site of a
WMD incident.
Since first responders will be required to establish
preliminary perimeters, provide triage to victims, and
conduct initial interviews, among other actions, their value
to the ultimate success of the Federal Government in managing
a WMD incident cannot be overestimated. Presently, most first
responders have little, if any, specialized training in the
WMD area, and as such, would become casualties at the
incident scene.
FEMA, DOE, DOD, HHS, EPA, and the FBI support training to
develop a strong State and local first responder
infrastructure. Some generic training is already being recast
to address WMD requirements. For instance, FEMA and DOD
currently have in place a training program for first
responders in areas near chemical weapon storage sites under
the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
(CSEPP). A training program based on CSEPP and tailored for
police/fire/rescue personnel in all jurisdictions is in the
initial stages of coordination with FEMA, FBI, and DOD. FEMA
is also building on its training for first responders
conducted through its National Fire Academy and Emergency
Management Institute. In addition, other agencies, such as
DOE, DOT, and EPA provide training through their normal
programs that are applicable to terrorism response.
Funding targeted for training in WMD response is being
provided through several different sources, as listed below
by amount and agency:
$51 million from DOD to the Nunn-Lugar;
$5.3 million from FEMA in training grants, including
firefighter training and equipment, to the States; and
$5 million from the Department of Justice (DOJ) for
responder training and equipment.
Federal resources must be used effectively in meeting
priority training needs of responders to the consequences of
a WMD incident.
Federal resources will not meet all of the anticipated
requests for dealing with the terrorist threat, especially in
the area of training. To ensure a coordinated training
approach, FEMA convened a Senior Interagency Group (SIG) on
consequence management to provide policy-level guidance in
the development of a Governmentwide terrorism training
strategy, as well as to address other issues related to
consequence management. In support of the SIG, an interagency
Training Task Group (TTG) was established to identify
training audiences and performance requirements, suggest
training design (including delivery methodology), define the
relationship to existing and ongoing training and
capabilities, and set training priorities and plans for
short-term and long-term activities. The SICG will continue
to monitor results from the TTG and other task groups and
provide additional guidance for implementation of an
interagency training strategy, which includes the following
elements:
Prioritize training under Nunn-Lugar.--In response to DOD's
request for guidance from FEMA and the interagency community
on the most appropriate way to allocate training resources to
meet training requirements specified in Nunn-Lugar, Section
1412, Emergency Response Assistance Program, the interagency
strategy calls for allocation of Nunn-Lugar resources
(including those provided to HHS for the development of the
MMSTs in FY 1997) to target these resources to the 20 largest
cities, plus any cities identified by the FBI as being at
particularly high risk. Participating cities will be asked to
complete an initial training needs assessment and Federal
resources and expertise will be applied to meeting those
needs, using existing training resources to the extent
possible. This focus of Nunn-Lugar resources on the 20
largest cities will in no way preclude other target audiences
(States, communities, etc.) from eligibility for other
training available from FEMA and other Federal agencies or
for training resources that may become available in the
future.
Continue to analyze training needs on the basis of
performance requirements.--Using the training requirements
identified during the FY 1996 assessment initiatives as a
base, a list of performance goals for communities in
preparing to respond to WMD incidents will be developed to
serve as a basis for a community's own needs assessment
efforts; however, needs assessment must be an ongoing
process, since training needs will evolve over time as new
equipment is fielded and experience gained.
Compile a compendium of existing training.--As noted
earlier, many courses and training materials already exist
that, with minor modifications, can begin to meet immediate
training requirements. FEMA will serve as the repository for
information on existing training courses and materials.
Share courses and delivery systems among agencies.--The
previously noted compendium of training resources maintained
by FEMA will facilitate sharing of courses and expertise
among agencies, thus reducing duplication of efforts.
Deliver existing or modified training in non-traditional
ways.--Alternative delivery
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strategies will be needed to reach more people than are
currently reached with classroom, instructor-based training.
Use of independent study, computer-based training, satellite
broadcasts, etc., will be considered in the overall delivery
strategy.
Develop new training for unmet needs.--It is anticipated
that FY 1997 will be used for assessment and delivery of
existing training and that development of new training will
begin in earnest during FY 1998.
Enhance interface with States and cities.--To increase the
success of the Federal interagency effort, full partnering
with the States and communities and constituencies will help
ensure that limited resources are applied most effectively.
Equipment and Capability Enhancements
This area involves identifying equipment and capabilities
needed for a WMD response. It includes stockpiling
specialized equipment, enhancing the medical response system
to include developing specialized teams and managing mass
casualties for a WMD incident, developing a master inventory
list of equipment and assets that can be accessed by local
and State responders, and undertaking other initiatives to
improve operational procedures, including rapid deployment of
resources to the incident site and improving communications
access.
The FBI is addressing the need for additional equipment for
specialized teams operating in a WMD environment.--While the
FBI relies on the support of other Federal agencies
possessing specific technical expertise and equipment to
respond to an NBC incident, those agencies do not have the
law enforcement authority or expertise to collect and
preserve evidence at a crime scene, nor to testify in court
proceedings. In addition to the critical issue of evidence
collection, the FBI may be faced with an incident that
requires a tactical response in an environment contaminated
with NBC material. The FBI currently possesses a limited
capability to operate in such an environment; recent
acquisition of funds will allow the for the purchase of
HAZMAT protective suits and equipment for HRT and all field
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Teams. This acquisition
followed by training will allow the FBI to enhance its
capabilities to operate in a WMD environment.
HHS is enhancing the capabilities of the medical response
system to address WMD requirements.--The requirement for
immediate and significant medical response to save and
protect lives in incidents involving C/B WMD agents has led
to several HHS initiatives to enhance the capabilities of the
existing medical response system. The enhanced system would
include trained and equipped local first responders, MMSTs,
specialized medical teams for use in areas without MMSTs,
Chemical/Biological Rapid Deployment Teams (CBRDTs), enhanced
Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), patient evacuation
and definitive care capabilities of the National Disaster
Medical System (NDMS), pharmaceutical caches, and a
nationwide network of facilities with specially trained staff
equipped to treat WMD victims. Some of these activities are
described below:
HHS continues work on developing MMSTs composed of
technical and medical resources for responding to C/B
incidents. The MMSTs provide a mechanism for immediate
medical response while additional Federal resources are being
mobilized and deployed. Each MMST operates as a specially
organized, trained, and equipped team and includes
capabilities for agent detection and identification, patient
decontamination, triage and medical treatment, patient
transportation to hospitals, and coordination with local law
enforcement activities. After testing the concept in the
Washington, DC, metropolitan area and at the 1996 Summer
Olympic Games, the Washington, DC, MMST established its
initial operational capability in January 1997, and was
available to support the 1997 Presidential Inauguration. The
goal is to establish a total of 100 MMSTs in the next 5
years.
HHS is developing three specialized national response
teams, dispersed geographically throughout the nation, to
augment local capabilities in areas without MMSTs.
The CBRDT is another capability developed by HHS providing
a highly specialized, Federal, multi-agency C/B terrorist
incident response, medical and health care, and technical
assistance that supports the OSC for both crisis management
and consequence management response.
HHS is enhancing 21 of the highest readiness level NDMS
DMATs with specialized equipment and training to provide
further response augmentation.
In concert with activities to enhance the medical response
system, HHS is addressing the need to develop local response
systems for the care of WMD victims. HHS is developing
procedures for the handling of mass casualties that may
result from an WMD incident to ensure that Federal resources
will be available to augment local and State resources for
dealing with a health problem of a large scale; however, a
timely Federal response can only argument existing local
capability and may not meet the needs of all of these
victims.
Federal logistics support capabilities are being enhanced
for WMD response.--FEMA is working with DOD, DOT and the
General Services Administration (GSA) to enhance basic
logistics support capabilities by developing a disaster
transportation management system. The system will include a
Time-Phased Force Deployment Data and List (TPFDDL) to pre-
identify logistics requirements for specialized teams,
equipment, and supplies needed to respond to an NBC incident
and to then optimize their movement to an incident site on a
priority basis. A Movement Coordination Center (MCC) is also
being developed to coordinate the transportation and movement
activities of the critical resources to the affected area.
FEMA is developing and implementing a Rapid Response
Information System.--FEMA is developing guidance and format
with data requirements for each FRP department and agency to
use in compiling an inventory of its equipment and assets
that could be made available to aid State and local officials
in responding to a WMD incident. FEMA is working to ensure
that FRP departments and agencies develop, maintain, and
provide to FEMA their inventory lists for inclusion in a
comprehensive Master Inventory, to be initially published by
December 31, 1997, with annual updates. FEMA also will
develop guidance on accessing and using the physical
equipment and assets on the Master Inventory List, including
a system to give Federal, State, and local officials
controlled access. In coordination with DOD, FEMA will also
prepare a database on C/B agents and munitions
characteristics and safety precautions for civilian use.
The initial design and compilation of this database is to
be completed not later than December 31, 1997.
Planning
This area involves enhancing Federal contingency plans as
well as national and regional response plans to better
address the WMD threat. It also includes the development of
guidance for local and State responders.
Each FBI office is developing contingency plans for
response to WMD incidents.--Each FBI field office has been
requested to furnish an updated plan yearly with points of
contact and area facilities that could pose a threat of a WMD
incident, or could supply the agents needed for a WMD
incident and resources that can be utilized to respond to the
incident. Additionally all field offices have been tasked to
maintain contingency plans that identify points of contact
with regional emergency response agencies and to engage with
local authorities in planned WMD exercises, review nuclear
facility response plans, and proceed with other proactive
initiatives to counter the threat of a WMD incident.
All FBI field offices with DOE or NRC facilities within
their territory maintain site-specific nuclear contingency
plans that are updated annually. These plans ensure that the
FBI possesses all necessary information regarding each DOE or
NRC site to enable an effective FBI response to an incident
at any of these sites. Classified and unclassified Nuclear
and C/B Incident Contingency Plans have been updated,
revised, and disseminated to all FBI Offices and OSCs. This
year, all FBI field offices were tasked to provide
unclassified versions of these plans to management levels of
first responders, i.e., police, fire, and emergency medical
personnel, to ensure their understanding and coordination
during a unified Federal response.
Federal emergency response plans are being refined to
address WMD consequences.--The PDD-39 assessment validated
the need to amend the FRP with incident-specific annexes to
better address the unique aspects of the response to a
terrorist event. The FRP Terrorism Incident Annex describes
the concept of operations for a terrorism response involving
the crisis management response, led by the FBI, and the
consequence management response, led by FEMA. The Federal
interagency community has concurred on the annex and it is
scheduled for publication in early 1997.
FEMA is also developing planning guidance on terrorism
response for use by FEMA Regional Offices to incorporate into
their interagency Regional Response Plans that describe how
the FRP is implemented at the regional level.
A draft FRP Radiological Incident Annex has been developed
that describes the relationship of the FRP to the FRERP,
which is used to coordinate Federal monitoring, assessment,
and other technical resources in response to a radiological
incident, including a WMD involving nuclear materials. The
draft annex is being validated in several radiological
incident exercises this year and is expected to be published
in 1997.
State and local governments are being supported in
improving plans for responding to the consequences of a WMD
incident.--States and localities face new planning challenges
in preparing for response to a terrorist event using WMD.
FEMA's experience in Oklahoma City and the feedback from the
metropolitan area focus groups indicate a need for additional
guidance by States and local governments for responding to a
terrorist incident, including notification procedures,
interface with law enforcement personnel, and access to
unique Federal capabilities and resources. This is especially
true for major metropolitan areas, where direct interface
with Federal response personnel and unique Federal resources
is more likely in a terrorist event than in a typical natural
disaster; therefore, a terrorism supplement to the recently
published Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning
is a priority for FY 1997. In addition to operational
planning guidance, there is a need to ensure that Governors
and other State senior policy officials are familiar with the
challenges they may face in responding to a terrorist event.
To
[[Page H659]]
meet this need, a popular NGA handbook, A Governor's Guide to
Emergency Management, will be updated to address terrorism-
specific issues.
Exercises
Improved plans and access to technical information,
equipment, and supplies will do little to improve terrorism
response capabilities without trained personnel who have had
the opportunity to test plans and procedures and assume their
roles and responsibilities in exercises. Therefore, while one
goal for FY 1997 addresses the development of an interagency
strategy for the delivery of training to State and local
responders, a related goal focuses on a coordinated approach
to exercising plans and procedures.
Agencies must test and evaluate plans, procedures, and
coordination mechanisms for responding to a WMD incident.--
Interagency WMD terrorism exercises are expensive and require
extensive planning to ensure that all participating agencies
most effectively test and evaluate their plans, procedures,
and coordination mechanisms for responding to a WMD incident
as part of the Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST).
Interagency participation in these exercises is vital to
familiarize all members of the crisis management community
with the command structures and functions of the various
components.
Despite the high costs, continuous efforts must be made to
exercise for possible WMD contingencies. The FBI is co-chair
and an active member of an interagency planning group for
exercises, which includes all Federal agencies with a role in
response to terrorism as members. WMD scenarios have been the
focus of most of the recent exercises and continue to be
highlighted in future exercise planning. The FBI Crisis
Incident Response Group (CIRG) plays a critical and essential
role in all exercise planning deployments and response to
credible incidents.
The FBI exercises with other Federal agencies extensively
and anticipates participating in up to eight federally
coordinated exercises and numerous State/local exercises
annually. A full-field exercise should be scheduled and
completed within the next two fiscal years.
Exercises will be used to test and improve consequence
management response capabilities.--This effort addresses the
need for improved understanding of and interoperability
between response plans at various levels of government and
responds to the previously noted requirement for multi-agency
and multi-jurisdictional training and exercising to clarify
roles and responsibilities and improve interoperability of
plans and procedures. FEMA's interagency National Exercise
Schedule provides a mechanism for documenting and
disseminating information on planned unclassified terrorism
WMD exercises involving multiple agencies and/or levels of
government.
Recognizing that terrorism consequence management plans and
procedures are either under development or just being
finalized, the FY 1997 Federal emphasis will be on tabletop
exercises in each FEMA Region to familiarize regional and
State responders with the new FRP Terrorism Incident Annex
and associated roles and responsibilities. This will
culminate in a functional consequence management exercise,
ILL WIND, which is scheduled for late FY 1997 in the
Washington, DC, area. In addition, FEMA and some States and
localities will be involved in exercises sponsored by other
agencies that will likely address both crisis and consequence
management issues.
DOD recommends a multi-agency series of field exercises
covering a wide range of C/B scenarios in order to build a
solid understanding of potential C/B terrorism, and to
systematically evaluate improved countermeasures to prevent
and respond to such incidents.
Finally, the SIG has expressed interest in reviewing a
coordinated terrorism exercise strategy similar to that
developed for training. In interfacing with State and local
governments, given the very limited resources available,
Federal coordination on planned exercises and priorities for
addressing deficiencies is essential. This Federal
coordination will occur in the Interagency Working Group-
Counterterrorism (IWG-CT) Exercise Subcommittee.
New Initiatives
Stemming from the FY 1995 National Defense Authorization
Act is a joint FBI and DOD initiative, in coordination with
the State Department, DOE, the U.S. Customs Service, the
Department of Commerce (DOC), and the Intelligence Community
(IC) to provide law enforcement officials, judges, and
prosecutors from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Eastern
Europe with training in countering nuclear/radiological
smuggling/trafficking and C/B proliferation.
This 3-year initiative, which includes the training of
officials from 3 to 12 FSU/Southern Tier countries at the
International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Budapest,
Hungary, or at the DOD facilities in Garmisch, Germany, is
now under way. The initiative will also provide WMD detection
equipment and training to law enforcement officials in their
respective countries and undertake a review of each country's
laws to recommend statutory changes to complement enforcement
and training, as warranted.
The FBI Laboratory Division has developed the Hazardous
Materials Response Unit (HMRU) to resolve scientific and
technical aspects of illegal acts involving NBC and
environmental incidents. The Laboratory Division has also
coordinated with DOD and the Commonwealth of Virginia for
training of FBI first responders and the Evidence Response
Teams (ERTs) on how to function in tandem with the military
in the hostile environment of a WMD incident. In this manner,
a sworn FBI evidence expert will direct the collection and
preservation of evidence, while at the same time, rely on
military advice and assets in order to mitigate a C/B agent
and for transport of C/B agents for examination purposes. To
date, more than 50 ERT members from 6 major metropolitan
field offices have been trained and equipped with HAZMAT
protective suits.
Research and Development
The FBI is currently pursuing a number of research and
development (R&D) efforts to enhance detection capabilities,
disablement tools, advanced render-safe techniques, and new
forensic tools for identifying terrorist bombings. R&D
projects include development of explosive detectors, research
on explosives residues, and development of a portable device
for the analysis of explosives, drugs, and chemical warfare
agents using Raman Spectroscopy. Other R&D projects aimed at
providing first responders with the technical capabilities to
safely and effectively contain a WMD incident include
development of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
countermeasures for large vehicle bombs, development of an
affordable miniaturized robotics vehicle capable of
delivering explosive disablement tools, identification of
render-safe procedures for improvised C/B devices, enhanced
explosive detection capabilities for civilian bomb
technicians, and the development of methods to identify
forensically and capture residues left by improvised
explosive charges used by terrorists.
A number of agencies throughout the counterterrorism
community participate in the Technical Support Working Group
(TSWG), a subgroup of the NSC Interagency Working Group on
Counterterrorism. The TSWG has the specific mission of
conducting rapid research, development, and prototyping of
counterterrorism technologies. Several different subgroups
exist beneath the TSWG focusing on various aspects of
counterterrorism. Continued funding of the TSWG and other
research and development programs is critical to developing
field-deployable technologies to deter, detect, prevent, and
resolve potential WMD terrorist threats and incidents.
MEASURES TO ACHIEVE IMPROVEMENTS
Building upon current activities, the following describes
the requirements for continued funding, legislative
improvements, authorities, and research and development (R&D)
initiatives to enhance current weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) prevention and response capabilities.
Funding
FY 1997 funding is supporting a variety of activities
deriving from existing NSC guidance, Nunn-Lugar initiatives,
and other programs to determine requirements, assess and
remedy shortfalls, and enhance capabilities for WMD
prevention and response. To maintain and enhance
capabilities, continued funding in FY 1998 and beyond is
required to support training, equipment and capability
building, planning, and exercises. This requirement for
continued funding assumes that State and local governments
are also willing to share some of the costs of the capability
building.
In FR 1997, the coordinated interagency training strategy
proposes to target the largest 20 cities to receive the
majority of training and assistance provided via Nunn-Lugar,
with the remaining resources spread among the many other
jurisdictions and response groups. In FY 1998, additional
jurisdictions are being added to increase the overall
preparedness level of local governments to deal with WMD
requirements. In support of this effort, training materials
will need to be updated as plans and procedures are refined
and responder needs are better defined.
Specialized equipment and protective gear for personnel
operating in a WMD environment are required by the FBI and
other agencies. The Rapid Response Information System will
require annual updating to ensure that the resource and
capability information being accessed by local and State
response agencies is accurate and complete.
Continued interagency planning will be required to ensure
close coordination among Federal departments and agencies and
State and local emergency management agencies in dealing with
WMD requirements.
Finally, most of the exercises planned for FY 1997 are
Federal/State tabletop exercises that are relatively
inexpensive to plan and deliver. In subsequent years,
functional and full-scale exercises involving all levels of
government will need to be developed and implemented to
ensure full capability.
Legislation
On April 24, 1996, the President signed into law the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. This
legislation, which was initially proposed by the President in
the State of the Union Address in January 1995, represents
the most significant and comprehensive antiterrorism
legislative package ever enacted in the United States.
Legislative proposals that remain relate to items that
Congress dropped from the 1995 Administration proposal, or
highly focused issues that have arisen in the course of
administering existing law. Within this context, it is
anticipated that DOJ will propose several items of
legislation designed to enhance the Government's ability to
combat terrorism.
[[Page H660]]
The first priority for additional legislation remains
Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
The CWC is the best means to ensure the nonproliferation of
chemical weapons and their eventual destruction by all
nations. This Convention makes it illegal to develop,
produce, acquire, stockpile, retain, transfer, use, own, or
possess any chemical weapon, or to knowingly assist,
encourage, or induce any person to do so, or attempt or
conspire to do so. U.S. compliance with the CWC will require
that changes be made to the existing criminal statutes
relating to use of chemical weapons, 18 U.S.C. Section 2332c,
and use of WMD, 18 U.S.C. Section 2332a. These legislative
amendments have been drafted within DOJ and are currently
undergoing review. Submission of such a legislative proposal
would have to be closely coordinated with the
Administration's efforts to achieve ratification of the CWC.
Although the CWC was not designed to prevent chemical
terrorism, certain aspects of the Convention, including its
implementing legislation and nonproliferation provisions,
will augment existing law enforcement efforts to fight
chemical terrorism. Implementing legislation required by the
CWC will strengthen legal authority to investigate and
prosecute violations of the treaty and raise the level of
public alertness to the threat and illegality of chemical
weapons. For example, the proposed U.S. implementing
legislation contains the clearest, most comprehensive, and
internationally recognized definition of a chemical weapon
available, far more precise than the term ``poison gas''
contained in Title 18 of the Criminal Code. The definition
contained in the implementing legislation will enable an
investigator to request a search warrant on the basis of
suspicion of illegal chemical weapons activity (such as
production of a chemical weapon agent), rather than suspicion
of conspiracy to commit terrorism, as exists under current
U.S. law. By providing investigators and prosecutors a more
precise legal basis for pursuing the development, production,
transfer, or acquisition of chemical weapons, CWC
implementing legislation improves prospects for detection,
early intervention, and possibly even prevention of chemical
terrorism in the United States.
Research and Development
New or enhanced technical capabilities needed to counter
increasingly sophisticated terrorist organizations include
the ability to intercept advanced telecommunications, with a
primary focus on wireless and satellite-based systems;
improved tracking and physical surveillance technologies for
weapons, explosives, etc.; automatic language translation and
text/key word recognition; and technology to support
surreptitious entry.
Current research and development funding is not adequate.
Additional funding is needed to continue work on an indepth
chemical characterization of foreign explosives and for
continued development of contraband detection technology.
Additional funding would accelerate development in a number
of key technologies, particularly communications
interception, tracking, covert communications, and
surreptitious access. These technologies are critical to the
support of counterterrorism investigations, especially WMD-
related threats.
____
ACRONYMS
AG--Attorney General
ANSIR--Awareness of National Security Issues and Response
ATSDR--Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
C/B--Chemical/Biological
CBR--Chemical/Biological/Radiological
CBRDT--Chemical/Biological Rapid Deployment Team
CDC--Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CIRG--Crisis Incident Response Group
COA--Course of Action
CRMER--Center for Risk Modeling and Emergency Response
CSEPP--Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
CT--Counterterrorism
CWC--Chemical Weapons Convention
DEST--Domestic Emergency Support Team
DMAT--Disaster Medical Assistance Team
DOC--Department of Commerce
DOD--Department of Defense
DOE--Department of Energy
DOJ--Department of Justice
DOS--Department of State
DOT--Department of Transportation
DTL--DEST Team Leader
EMS--Emergency Medical Services
EOD--Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPA--Environmental Protection Agency
ERT--Evidence Response Team
ESF--Emergency Support Function
FBI--Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDA--Food and Drug Administration
FEMA--Federal Emergency Management Agency
FOSC--Federal On-Scene Coordinator
FRERP--Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan
FRMAC--Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
FRP--Federal Response Plan
FSU--Former Soviet Union
FY--Fiscal Year
GSA--General Services Administration
HAZMAT--Hazardous Materials
HHS--Department of Health and Human Services
HMRU--Hazardous Materials Response Unit
HQ--Headquarters
HRSA--Health Resources and Services Administration
HRT--Hostage Rescue Team
IC--Intelligence Community
IED--Improvised explosive device
IICT--Interagency Intelligency Committee on Terrorism
ILEA--International Law Enforcement Academy
INS--Immigration and Naturalization Service
IWG--Interagency Working Group
IWG-CT--Interagency Working Group-Counterterrorism
JABC--Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
JIC--Joint Information Center
JOC--Joint Operations Center
MCC--Movement Coordination Center
MMST--Metropolitan Medical Strike Team
MSU--Medical Management Support Unit
MTAG--Missile Trade Analysis Group
NAREL--National Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory
NBC--Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical
NCP--National Contingency Plan
NDMS--National Disaster Medical System
NEIC--National Enforcement Investigations Center
NEST--Nuclear Emergency Search Team
NEVWG--Nuclear Export Violation Working Group
NGA--National Governors Association
NIH--National Institutes of Health
NRAT--Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team
NRC--Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRT--National Response Team
NSC--National Security Council
OEP/OPHS--Office of Emergency Preparedness/Office of Public
Health and Science
ORIA--Office of Radiation and Indoor Air
OSC--On-Scene Commander
PDD--Presidential Decision Directive
PHS--Public Health Service
PPE--Personal Protective Equipment
R&D--Research and Development
RRT--Regional Response Team
SAC--Special Agent-in-Charge
SAMHSA--Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration
SIG--Senior Interagency Groups
SWAT--Special Weapons and Tactics
TEU--Technical Escort Unit
TPFDDL--Time-Phased Force Deployment Data and List
TSWG--Technical Support Working Group
TTG--Training Task Group
U.S.--United States
USCG--U.S. Coast Guard
USDA--United States Department of Agriculture
USG--United States Government
WMD--Weapons of Mass Destruction
____________________
---------------------------------------------------------------
[End]
14 March 1997
See related documents:
"The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997":
http://jya.com/ndatoc.htm (70K toc; 1.5M full act)
"The Antiterrorism Act of 1996":
http://jya.com/pl104-132.txt (358K)
Senate "Intelligence Committee Report 1995-96":
http://jya.com/sr105-1.htm (135K)
"Intelligence Authorization Act for 1997":
http://jya.com/pl104-293.txt (85K)
"Executive Order 13010--Critical Infrastructure Protection":
http://jya.com/eo13010.txt (20K)
"Implementation of Section 104 of the Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act":
http://jya.com/fbi011497.txt (71K)
And several presidental orders and congressional reports on
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:
http://jya.com/wmd022797.txt (19K)
http://jya.com/no111496.txt (36K)
http://jya.com/wmd092796.txt (76K)
http://jya.com/wmd092995.txt (25K)
http://jya.com/wmd060995.txt (108K)
http://jya.com/wmd100694.txt (61K)
5 May 1997
Domestic terrorism measures by DoD and FBI:
http://jya.com/dod041697.htm
http://jya.com/fbi041797.htm
Annual State Department reports on Patterns of Global Terrorism:
http://jya.com/pgt1996.htm (note .htm)
http://jya.com/pgt1995.txt
http://jya.com/pgt1994.txt
http://jya.com/pgt1993.txt
Senate and White House on the Chemical Weapons Convention:
http://jya.com/s495.htm
http://jya.com/cwc042597.txt
ATF on explosive materials and bomb threats:
http://jya.com/atf042597.txt
http://jya.com/bomb.htm